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Abstract: This paper deals with the video game console market. We are not interested 
here in portable consoles nor in PC games. Our work focuses on the role of core 
competencies in console wars, analyzing the way these competencies are activated within 
the firms' business models. The home console market also exhibits crossed network 
externalities, which requires console manufacturers the ability to conciliate the interests of 
both developers and gamers. From a strategic point of view, core competencies are 
closely related with market performance. Today, Sony's and Microsoft's business models 
are quite similar. However, Microsoft and Sony remain far behind Nintendo and its Wii, 
which suggests that core competencies do not discriminate on performance as much as 
the positioning choices made upstream when the strategy is crafted. The link between 
core competencies, economic model and strategy is at the heart of this study.  
Key words: video game console, business model, core competencies, two-sided market, 
platform.  
 
his paper examines the way firms leverage their core competencies 
in order to achieve market dominance in the video game console 
sector. Since the end of the 90's, the home console market has 
become a full-fledged component of the entertainment industry. This cyclical 
market is characterized by network externalities, the increasing 
sophistication of video games and game consoles and the surge of strategic 
marketing. All these aspects are approached in the 1
st part, which provides a 
general description of this market. 
Since the beginning of the century, this industry has witnessed major 
developments: the arrival of Microsoft in 2001 onto the game console 
segment, a growing interest of game publishers in other platforms, the 
emergence of new platforms such as smartphones, the development of 
online services as illustrated by WiiWare, Xbox Live or Playstation Network 
and more recently video game tournament coverage on broadcast networks. 
All of these elements have a fundamental impact on the value chain and on 
the strategies of both the established players and the newcomers.  
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In the 2
nd part of the paper, we introduce the concept of business model 
(BM), underlying the role of core competencies. We will focuss on Sony's 
and Microsoft's BMs within a comparative analysis. A business model is a 
framework to compete in a given industry. It is the set of activities which a 
firm performs and how it performs them in order to deliver its customers a 
superior value proposition. Thus, focusing on core competencies helps to 
understand how this value proposition is crafted. 
   The mutations of the video game sector 
In this part, the emphasis is mainly on the three console manufacturers' 
strategies (Microsoft, Sony, and Nintendo). The strategic directions of game 
publishers are not analyzed in depth here because of their number. 
Moreover, home consoles are privileged in this work insofar as they 
generate a large share of the industry's revenue.  
A rapidly expanding market  
The market's growth is steady for all segments of the sector, which 
should reach €48 billion by the end of 2008. Home console sales (and sales 
of associated software) are mainly responsible for driving the market 
forward, despite a dip in 2005, at the time of transition between two console 
generations (IDATE, 2003).  
The arrival of new consoles, 2005-2007: the triumph of the Wii 
The video game console market is subject to a relatively short 
technological cycle, meaning the renewal of game consoles every 5-6 years. 
2005 is a turning point, as Microsoft was the first to launch a next generation 
console on the market: the Xbox 360. Because of the gap between the 
various consoles' launch dates, Microsoft's sales logically overtook Sony's 
and Nintendo's in 2006. It is thus only in 2007 that the market trends appear 
more clearly with respect to each next generation console's progression and 
success (see table 1). The most recent numbers (June 30
th, 2008) seem to 
confirm the trends observed in 2007 and early 2008: Nintendo has sold over 
26 million Wii worldwide since its launch in December 2006, as compared to 
20 million Xbox 360 and 14 million PS3.  N. DAIDJ & T. ISCKIA  25 
Table 1 - Geographical distribution of worldwide sales  
of Xbox 360, PS3 and Wii since their launch 
North America  Europe  Japan   
Launch date  Total Sales * Launch date Total sales * Launch 
Date 
Total sales * 
Xbox 360 
(Microsoft) 
Nov. 2005  11.11 million  Dec. 2005  5.68 million  Dec. 2005  590,000 
PS3 
(Sony) 
Nov. 2006  4.18 million  March 2007  4.47 million  Nov. 2006  1.97 million 
Wii 
(Nintendo) 
Nov. 2006  9.66 million  December 
2006 
7.1 million  Dec. 2006  5.5 million 
* These numbers tally the total sales since the consoles' launch to March 1
st, 2008.  
Source : http://www.vgchartz.com 
A cycle reversal? 
The development of game consoles requires huge financial resources, 
because of their technological sophistication. The transition from one 
generation to another is always a delicate stage both for console 
manufacturers and game publishers. Each cycle registers the abandoning of 
some established firms' activities but also the arrival of newcomers. The next 
generation brings new knowledge in relation to the previous cycles along 
four points:  
•  The shortening of cycles: Microsoft and Nintendo have deliberately 
accelerated their machines' obsolescence and shortened the cycle to 
counter Sony. In an interview with l'Expansion on March 24
th, 2006, Sony 
Computer Entertainment Studios CEO Phil Harrison said the following:  
"The life cycle (7 years) we have adopted for our consoles is longer 
than our competitors' […]. Since our arrival on the game console 
market, we have never been the first to launch the first machine during 
the transition toward a new console generation […]. We are simply on 
a different calendar." 
•  The race for technological performance: until now, each generation 
was characterized by consoles whose technical performance became ever 
more powerful and similar (DAIDJ & QUÉLIN, 2005). The consoles' 
commercial success was conditioned above all by their technical prowess. 
However, the Nintendo's Wii -launched in 2007- counteracts this trend. It 
distinguishes itself from its competitors by its more limited technical 
performances. In order to become the leader, Nintendo bet less on 26     No. 73, 1
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technological innovation and more on their console's superior "fun factor" 
over the PS3 and Xbox 360 (cf. next part). 
•  Market structure: since 1973, the effective launch date of the first 
consoles by Atari, the console market alternates between phases of 
monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly, even if the oligopoly tends to become 
dominant. Until the current generation, all periods have been characterized 
by a leader who stepped down in favor of another competitor (Atari and 
Sega). However, the return of "Big N" to the first place on the home console 
segment (which they already occupied in the 1980s) is a scoop (DAIDJ, 
2008b). 
• The established model of the "razor and blades": console 
manufacturers sell their products at relatively low prices while ensuring 
substantial complementary revenue by selling games developed internally or 
granting rights to publishers who can in return develop new software:  
"This industry uses the model of the business of razor and razor 
blades, selling subsidized hardware to win in the software. Unlike other 
mass media, it does not generate revenue from advertising, it is 
generated by proprietary hardware and no interoperability, which is a 
factor that is crucial to competition" (TOMASELLI, DI SERIO, DE 
OLIVEIRA, 2008, p. 16). 
The structural characteristics of the video game console industry 
In order to better understand firms' business models in the video game 
console industry, we will provide a brief summary that explains the main 
characteristics of this industry. These characteristics entail that the operators 
must make choices likely to influence their ability to generate revenue, and 
furthermore, their console's success.  
Video game consoles: a platform industry  
A platform is a system made up of several physical and/or software 
modules linked by interfaces (GAWER & CUSUMANO, 2002; BALDWIN & 
CLARK, 2000). The design of these interfaces can rest on open architecture 
or not. In the first instance, design is based on the use of open and public 
standards facilitating interoperability between the various components 
manufactured by third parties and in fine between platforms. In the second 
case however, design rests on the use of proprietary standards, reducing 
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– like those of previous generations – are proprietary systems; in other 
words, there is no interoperability between these systems.  
For instance, a game developed for Xbox 360 is not compatible with a 
game developed for PS3. For a single game, the portability requires specific 
developments. At this level, architectural choices are very important. They 
can make developer's jobs easier or on the contrary make it longer and 
more complex, thereby directly influencing production costs. For example, 
Sony's choice to equip the PS3 with the Cell processor considerably slowed 
the work of developers because of a totally different architecture from 
traditional processors, to the point where IBM was forced to call on several 
teams of engineers to help developers and enable them to use the Cell's 
power. PS3 production costs are also higher than that of the Xbox 360 
because of the choice of components (cf. part 2). De facto, the various 
elements or modules of a platform are rarely manufactured by the same 
company. As stressed by GAWER & CUSUMANO (2008):  
"An industry platform involves not only one company's technology or 
service but also an ecosystem of complements to it that are usually 
produced by a variety of businesses. As a result, becoming a platform 
leader requires different business and technology strategies than those 
needed to launch a successful stand-alone product".  
The choice of partners and the components they provide is also 
important, as are the aspects pertaining to the supply chain management. 
This requires from manufacturers a global vision of the company's supply 
flows but also of its suppliers and customers, and the ability to efficiently 
coordinate these players, whose interests sometimes diverge in particular 
with respect to production costs.  
An industry characterized by high network externalities 
The video game console sector exhibits network externalities (positive) 
which have important consequences on the market and the players' choices, 
especially those related to their BMs. Two types of network externalities can 
be distinguished: direct and indirect externalities. Direct externalities appear 
when the satisfaction (utility) stemming from the consumption of a product or 
use of a service directly derives from the number of individuals already 
consuming the product or using the service. It is thus an intra-group 
externality. Indirect externalities appear when the demand for a product on a 
market depends on the offer of another product without which the first 
cannot function. The appearance of this type of externality is conditioned by 28     No. 73, 1
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the existence of two complementary products forming a 'system' product or a 
platform such as game consoles. In this context, two categories of agents 
are distinguished, and the value of a product for one category is positively 
correlated to the number of agents on the other side of the market. This is an 
inter-group externality. Developers will thus have all the more incentive to 
offer new games (software) for a console as the number of gamers using the 
console (hardware) grows.  
Crossed or indirect network externalities are then observed. They are 
indeed network externalities in the sense that the value of the product 
depends on the number of users, but they are said to be crossed because 
the users in question belong to different categories: developers on the one 
hand and players on the other. The platform thus internalizes the indirect 
externalities (ROCHET & TIROLE, 2003), which can usually be divided into 
two types: membership externalities and usage externalities. Indeed, since 
there are two interdependent groups of agents, membership externalities 
mean that the usefulness for group A is an increasing function of the number 
of agents in group B. This is the ex ante incentive for a new agent to join a 
given group. Usage externalities are a result of the ex post interactions 
between two different groups of agents and originate from the use of the 
platform itself (the console), and particularly from the intensity of this use. 
The existence of network externalities has several important consequences:  
•  Demand doesn't depend solely on price or revenue, but also on the 
current number of users. The more the product is used, the higher its 
intrinsic value, but also its relative value in relation to competing products. Of 
course, the price and the revenue aspects are important too.  
•  The existence of switching costs and lock-in situations. When the 
installed user base is large, changing platforms is costly for users. The 
existence of switching costs can lead to users giving up the idea of changing 
their consumption and lock the market. From this point of view, with each 
generation change, the behavior of firms on the market can be seen as a 
race for early adopters (GALLAGHER & PARK, 2002).   
•  Finally, when there are economies of scale in production (high fixed 
costs and low marginal costs), network effects accentuate the market's 
dynamics: the larger the network, the higher the demand, lowering unit 
production price, and potentially prices, which further increases demand.  N. DAIDJ & T. ISCKIA  29 
The game console market is a two-sided market 
Several works have specified the characteristics of two-sided markets 
(CAILLAUD & JULLIEN, 2001; ARMSTRONG, 2002; EVANS, 2003; 
ROCHET & TIROLE, 2006, ARMSTRONG, 2006; CORTADE, 2006; 
WAULTY, 2008). Two-sided markets are similar on the one hand to network 
effect markets because of the presence of externalities, and on the other 
hand to the problem of multi-product firms because of the role played by 
pricing models. However, they are different from network effect markets 
mainly because the network externalities are crossed. Network effects 
spread from one side of the market to another, from one category of agents 
to another (inter-group externalities), rather than within a given group (intra-
group externalities). In such a market, the middleman's (manufacturer's) role 
is quite complex since their ability to efficiently coordinate the demand of two 
client groups depends on their decisions. The main challenge is to attract 
both groups, given that their participation depends on the others' presence.  
One way to proceed is to obtain a critical mass of users on one side of 
the market. This is what usually happens when a new console generation is 
launched. Manufacturers do not hesitate to lower the sales price of their 
console, even if this means selling at loss, in order to increase the user base 
and trigger network externalities on the gamer side. Another way is to invest 
in one side of the market in order to stimulate its subscription. This is what 
manufacturers usually do when they provide software development kits 
(SDKs) and other APIs (Application Programming Interface) to assist second 
and third-party developers. This is the case with Microsoft's DirectX and 
Direct3D libraries, respectively used to program multimedia and 3D 
applications for the Xbox360 (and PC). This is also what Sony does through 
its subsidiary SN Systems or its partnership with NVIDIA Corporation, which 
offers the development kit for the RSX GPU that equips the PS3. In both 
cases, the goal is to offer more assistance to developers, generate network 
externalities on the developer side and dissuade developers from committing 
to competing platforms (multi-homing).  
The optimal price for both client groups is the one that balances demand 
between both groups. In other words, in two-sided markets, price can favor a 
group over another, according to the importance of the (indirect) externalities 
generated by this group. If group A generates higher externalities for group 
B than group B generates for group A, then group A can be sponsorized and 
benefit from lower prices (PARKER & VAN ALSTYNE, 2002). This is the 
case between gamers and developers: by lowering the console's price, the 
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of developers. Gamers are thus 'sponsored' over developers. Consequently, 
the choice of a pricing model must be made after considering the effect of a 
tariff component on one side of the market, not only on that side but also on 
the other, i.e. taking into account the feedback loop that spreads from one 
side of the market to the other.  
   The business models of the video game industry 
The notion of business model 
The Business Model: a matter of choice 
If the concept of BM is not yet very well defined in academic literature, 
the analysis of the various definitions available reveals a number of recurring 
elements (AMIT & ZOTT, 2001; SHAFER et al., 2005; DEMIL et al., 2004, 
2006; VOELPEL et al., 2004; MARGRETTA, 2002) among which: the means 
of generating revenue, the resources and competencies required, and the 
ways transactions between participants are organized. Based on these 
elements, the BM explains how the resources and competencies marshalled 
by a company allow it to develop a value proposition for its various client 
groups and how it consequently orders its internal value chain and value 
network.  
At this stage, it is necessary to make the distinction between two cases. 
Either the company has all the resources and competencies required to 
develop (in-house) its own value proposition, or it lacks some of them, in 
which case it will have to select them on the market and appoint them wisely 
through the choice of relationship strategies. The first case usually refers to 
vertically integrated firms which have a large variety of resources and 
competencies at their disposal. In the second case, the company must thus 
assign resources belonging to other players within the company's value 
network or external value chain. From this first choice (make or buy) stems a 
second, which pertains to the organization of the company's internal value 
chain and its processes. Indeed, the choice of the activities which will make 
up the company's value chain will be a result of the choices made pertaining 
to which resources will be assigned internally, but also of the choice of 
addressable resources on the market, through the company's value network. N. DAIDJ & T. ISCKIA  31 
The industry's value chain allows the players to identify these various 
resources and competencies and supplies the framework from which they 
will develop their own value proposition. The BM supplies the particular 
framework from which a given player will develop its value proposition for the 
end-client. While the value chain shows the rules within an industry, the BM 
shows how each player plays within this industry. The third type of choice is 
thus linked to the type of relationships with the various partners involved in 
developing the offer for the end-client.  
The resources and skills to be drafted 
Resources and skills are elements that actively contribute to creating 
value and generating revenue (PENROSE, 1959). The manager's role is 
mainly to combine and coordinate the resources which will allow value 
added to be generated for customers. This ability to combine and coordinate 
is a function of accumulated experience and knowledge and reveals general 
capabilities at the organizational level, i.e. skills. These skills reflect the 
fundamental knowledge at the company's disposal, its central skills 
(PRAHALAD & HAMEL, 1990) or core competencies. In other words, core 
competencies reveal the firm's identity, its trademark. They make up what it 
knows how to do itself, i.e the essence of its activity and its 'raison d'être'. In 
order to succeed, the firm must thus exploit its core competencies as best it 
can and wisely marshall those of its partners. 
'Internal-external' coherence 
In any of these views, the notion of BM reflects a company's choices, 
which have as a starting point an analysis of the resources and 
competencies necessary to develop an offer for the end-client, for whom the 
product is made (not to be confused with those clients who indirectly 
participate in its development, i.e. 'external' clients located outside the 
boundaries of the company, within its value network). Besides, if the firm's 
value chain allows the internal value creation processes to be explained, the 
value network allows the external value creation processes to be explained, 
making the BM a link between these two areas, internal and external. The 
BM thus ensures coherence between these three areas and enables the 
company to manage the value creation process for all the parties, including 
the end-client.  32     No. 73, 1
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Creating and harnessing value 
If the BM explains the value creation process for all participants, it also 
shows how this value is shared out between the various players, i.e. their 
ability to capture a part of the generated value. There can be a wide gap 
between value generated and value captured. In our case, about a third of 
overall turnover goes to development and publishing, the remaining two 
thirds going to distribution and sales (LE DIBERDER, 2001; LACROIX, 
2005). The value harnessed by development (studios) is thus quite low even 
though these activities are at the root of most of the generated value. The 
relationships within the video game value chain are unbalanced in favor of 
the console manufacturers who dominate the publishers (Sony, Microsoft 
and Nintendo are also publishers) by imposing their prices (DAIDJ, 2007). 
Publishers in turn dominate development studios. In this context, only one 
financial model currently governs the industry: that where the publisher fully 
takes charge of production costs. In return for their role of bankers, 
publishers impose contracts upon development studios that make them 
shoulder the risk of production (only about 5% of games produced are 
profitable) and confine them to a 'make-work' role. In concrete terms, the 
studios' BM only allows the developers to capture a very small part of the 
generated value, revealing an inadequacy between the internal value chain 
and the value network. The developers' BM confines studios to a 
background role of simple service providers instead of game producers.  
Business model and strategy 
As summarized by DEMIL et al (2004):  
"The BM is not the choice of mission, product/market couplings or the 
analysis of a firm's competition. In this sense, it is downstream from 
strategic reflection".  
The BM is the counterpart to strategy and covers the implementation of 
the strategy. It thus refers more to operational aspects. Basically, the BM 
translates the choices made upstream of the strategic approach into 
operational terms and is an intermediate level of analysis between a 
company's strategy and its functional translations. The BM reveals strategic 
choices made upstream, and articulated around four dimensions associated 
with clients (what is the value proposition for the client?), expertise (what are 
the required skills?), network (what are the modalities of collaboration 
between the various parties?) and revenue (how does the company make 
money?) which will determine the value created and the share of this value 
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In the following section, we shall mainly examine the nature of the 
competencies used by Sony and Microsoft to develop their respective 
consoles (The PlayStation and Xbox families), as well as the relationships 
with their main partners, particularly second- and third-party developers. We 
won't introduce in our analysis Nintendo's BM. Indeed, even if Nintendo's BM 
share common features with those of Sony and Microsoft, the strategy 
adopted by Nintendo is a "blue ocean strategy" (KIM & MAUBORGNE, 
2005) and by no means can be compared to that of Sony and Microsoft. 
Sony's and Microsoft's core resources and competencies 
Sony: present all along the media value chain 
Originally, Sony was mainly a consumer electronics group, renowned for 
the quality, originality, design and innovation of its products since its creation 
in 1946.  
The 'PlayStation' family 
Sony developed their expertise in the field of electronics to design the 
first PlayStation (PS1) in 1994. With this launch, Sony was the first to 
change game formats and offer CDs instead of the old cartridges, thus 
contributing to the spread of 3D in the video game field. The launch of the 
PlayStation 2 (PS2) in 2000 marks the appearance of 128-bit consoles. 
Sony used the same approach they did when launching the PS1. At the time 
of launch, the PS2 incorporated a number of technical innovations. The old 
CD-ROM drive gave way to a DVD drive, turning the PS2 into a home 
entertainment system. The console also integrated two network ports for 
online gaming. The PS2 game controllers comprised two solenoid motors for 
better feedback. Finally, the PS2 was backward-compatible with most 
existing PS1 games (about 95%). The PS2 was an even bigger success 
than the PS1, selling 130 million units (by March 31st, 2008) while benefiting 
from a large software catalog. Once again, the PS2 gained the upper hand 
over the competition (Dreamcast, GameCube, and Xbox). With the PS3, 
Sony poured all its know-how into the design of this new console. Designed 
to be a true media center, supporting various audio and video formats, the 
PS3 is equipped with a Blu-Ray drive (DAIDJ & HAMMOUDI, 2008), a hard 
drive, a High Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI) port, 4USB ports, an 
Internet browser, wireless Bluetooth capability and the new DualShock 3 
controllers with motion sensors. Like the PS2, the PS3 allows online gaming 34     No. 73, 1
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through the PlayStation Network via a Wi-Fi connection. Finally, the PS3 is 
equipped with a CPU (the Cell) and a GPU (the RSX) offering impressive 
processing power. Sony has stayed true to its tradition of backward-
compatibility, since the 60 GB and 80 GB models of the PS3 are compatible 
with most PS1 and PS2 games.  
Three competencies in the service of one family 
Sony has at its disposal a real know-how in the field of consumer 
electronics, which gives it a significant technological advantage. Moreover, 
Sony is a one of the great vertically integrated industrial groups. 
Consequently, the firm's industrial organization relies only little on local 
subcontracting. Local content is high, but this is thanks to a vertical 
integration of the group's various subsidiaries. In other words, Sony 
manufactures a large part of the components that make up its various 
platforms. About 40% of the PS2's components and 50% of the PS3's are 
manufactured by the group (iSuppli Corp, November 2006). The rest are 
usually bought ready-made from various manufacturers, and console 
manufacturing is usually subcontracted to other players. Benefitting from 
accumulated experience and know-how over 20 years for CDs and 10 years 
for DVDs, Sony is also the leader in the field of storage media on the 
European market. Indeed, the Japanese firm owns several subsidiaries 
which allow it to control the entire electronic device manufacturing process 
as well as the media value (Sony Pictures Entertainment, Sony Music 
Entertainment). Aside from the development and publishing of video games, 
Sony has a hand in content and owns several film studios under the banner 
of Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE), in charge of producing and 
distributing films to theaters, television, video and DVD and the Internet. This 
aspect is particularly important, as since the mid-1980s there has been a 
convergence, on the one hand between access networks and content, and 
on the other between forms of content themselves, as is the case for video 
games and movies with partnerships between film studios and video game 
publishers.  
Microsoft: from software to game consoles 
Founded in 1975 by Bill Gates and Paul Allen, Microsoft is one of the 
large software publishers in the world, behind IBM. Microsoft's core activity is 
software engineering, i.e. design, development and production of software, 
mainly the operating systems (OS) that equip PCs. Windows is by far the 
most widely-used OS in the world on PC platforms. But the company's range N. DAIDJ & T. ISCKIA  35 
of activities is not limited to operating systems alone. It nowadays covers 
every field of consumer and professional computing: PC and server OSs, 
business software, applied platforms, security, and – more recently – video 
games. The diversification of Microsoft towards the video game sector dates 
back to 2001, the year the Xbox was launched. Microsoft had two objectives: 
to break the supremacy of Japanese firms, mainly Sony and its PS2, and to 
have at their disposal a new point of entry into homes by developing a media 
center.  
The Xbox family 
The Xbox console is almost identical to a PC. It is equipped with an Intel 
Pentium III processor at 733 MHz, and an Nvidia NV2a GPU built from the 
chip equipping the GeForce 3 (233 MHz). The console is also equipped with 
64Mb of DDR Ram, an internal 8 - 10 GB hard drive (WD, Seagate), a DVD 
drive, a Dolby Digital 5.1 compatible audio system, and a network port to 
play online through the Xbox Live online service. The OS used by the Xbox 
is derived from Windows 2000. This is a strategic choice for Microsoft, given 
that Windows OSs usually incorporate an API library to make the 
development of multimedia applications easier, known as DirectX. These 
development interfaces ensure the interoperability between the various 
software components and improve the quality of graphical and audio 
applications in Windows. At the time of launch, DirectX was a success with 
PC game developers. In its console version, DirectX is considered the 
'backbone' of Xbox – and later Xbox 360 – development APIs. 
Consequently, the Xbox benefited at the time of launch from a large software 
catalog which grew over time. From 2005, with the Xbox 360, Microsoft truly 
became a competitor to Sony, with undeniable sales performance (cf. table 
1). Microsoft has taken several initiatives to boost its console's sales, by 
tailoring its consoles and their functionality to the target audience, 
developing new online services with Xbox Live, by offering new games 
through partnerships, betting on exclusives such as Halo 3 which noticeably 
increased Xbox 360 sales, and by offering more attractive prices in order to 
align itself with the competition, and mainly to slow down Nintendo.  
Microsoft's core competencies: from PC OSs to Xbox OSs 
When Microsoft decided to launch the first Xbox in 2001, the company 
still lacked experience in the video game field, mainly with respect to 
hardware. Moreover, it suffered from a fairly negative image linked to its 
monopoly on operating systems. On the software side though, Microsoft had 
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Windows CE to Dreamcast. With the launch of the Xbox 360, the choice of 
which OS to equip the console with once again had Microsoft's full attention. 
Indeed, having chosen to equip the next-generation Xbox with a processor 
based on IBM's PowerPC architecture, the chosen OS could not be 
Windows XP or even Windows CE, which are incompatible with this 
processor. Once again, Microsoft managed to apply its software engineering 
know-how to develop a specific OS for the Xbox 360, based on Longhorn, 
better known as Windows Vista. This choice presented several advantages. 
It first allowed Microsoft to lock the Xbox 360's OS, ensuring that no 
competing OS could be used on the console. Moreover, Microsoft can offer 
developers DirectX10, which integrates a new version of Direct3D entirely 
dedicated to 3D graphics. Beyond this, DirectX10 allows for the development 
of hybrid games, common to Xbox 360 and the Windows family, mainly 
Vista. However, since Vista integrates a version of Windows Media Center, it 
becomes possible to use the console as a true media center to read image, 
video and audio files, watch, and record shows.  
The creation of the Xbox Next-Generation Architecture (XNA) is another 
expression of Microsoft's core competencies. Unveiled in late 2006, XNA is a 
free development framework offered by Microsoft in order to give the public 
at large access to game development. This decision of developing XNA 
comes within the scope of a long-term strategy aiming to ensure perennial 
relations with developers, the key to success in the field of video 
games. Indeed, XNA is much more than a simple SDK: it is a full-fledged 
service intended for the developer community in order to reduce 
development time and costs. Moreover, this framework ensures the 
backward-compatibility of games with the new generations of Microsoft's 
platforms. Finally, games developed in XNA are exclusively distributed 
through Xbox Live, its online gaming service.  
Through these examples, it is shown that the value proposition offered to 
gamers, but also to developers, largely rests on Microsoft's ability to assign 
its core competencies in the field of in-house software development in an 
original manner. This value proposition is embodied, for the first group, in a 
versatile and powerful console with numerous games, and for the second, in 
services aimed at improving their performance.  
Development costs associated with consoles 
Today, consoles are hybrid products, halfway between PCs and media 
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user to watch films, listen to music, look at images, browse the Internet and 
play online. Moreover, it can be debated whether these 'secondary' 
functions, in terms of design, will not progressively supersede the primary 
function. In other words, the value proposition embodied in a console 
depends more and more on the 'secondary' functions and the uses they 
cover.  
These multiple functions and the associated technologies have a cost, 
however, which leads manufacturers to make painful sacrifices. Thus, with 
the exception of Nintendo (Wii), both Sony (PS3) and Microsoft (Xbox 360) 
sell their consoles at a loss. Manufacturers thus have no other alternative 
than to compensate losses on hardware sales by gains on software 
(YOFFIE & KWAK, 2006). This phenomenon feeds the price war between 
Sony and Microsoft. Indeed, since their launch, the Xbox 360 and the PS3 
have both experienced several successive price drops. But these price 
drops are less a reflection of the protagonists' industrial power than they are 
of the marketing obligation of stimulating console sales in order to increase 
the user base, and through a feedback effect, to give incentive to studios to 
develop more games for their respective platforms. In fact, the price drops 
consented to on hardware are not the result of economies of scale (at least 
during the launch phase). They aren't the result of lowered unit prices for 
internal components either. Some of these components are often developed 
or co-developed specifically, such as CPUs and GPUs, and are fixed costs.  
Once the characteristics of the various components that equip game 
consoles, as well as their cost, are examined in greater detail, it is easier to 
understand the difficulties faced by console manufacturers. According to the 
information provided by iSuppli Market Watch (November 2006), the 
distribution of costs by component for the PS3 (20 and 60 GB models) in 
November 2006, i.e. at the console's launch in Japan and North America, a 
60 GB PS3 sold $599 at the time of launch cost $840 to manufacture, 
whereas the 20 GB model sold for $499 and cost $805 to manufacture. 
These numbers are based exclusively on raw materials (excluding marketing 
costs and software development) and the retail price is that set at the 
console's North American launch. In other words, Sony lost $241.35 on each 
60 GB PS3 sale and $306.85 on each 20 GB PS3. In these conditions, it is 
necessary for the console manufacturer to compensate its loss by releasing 
a large number of games, if possible blockbusters.  
At the launch of the Xbox 360 (Premium version), the loss on the sale of 
each console was much inferior to that of the PS3 at the time of launch. 
Indeed, at the time of launch the price of the Xbox 360 in North America was 38     No. 73, 1
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$399 whereas its manufacturing cost (excluding marketing and software 
development) was estimated at around $550. The loss per console was thus 
only $150, 50% less than the loss on a 60 GB PS3 and 60% less than the 20 
GB model.  
Game consoles are products with a very high technological content, 
which incorporate highly sophisticated software and hardware components, 
often developed specifically. The power of CPUs has a cost for console 
manufacturers, but also for developers, mainly second- and third-party. 
Indeed, the complexity of current platforms is such that development costs 
have literally exploded over the past few years and deadlines have 
lenghthened.  
The design of a video game requires that multiple and rare competencies 
be drafted. It covers several steps, among which design, preproduction, 
production, post-production (testing) to lead to a master which will be given 
to the publisher (and/or console manufacturer in charge of duplicating and 
packaging). The design process is approximately 12 to 20 months long. 
Today, the cost of developing a game is somewhere between €5 and 20 
million, these costs incorporating development and associated investments 
(engines, SDKs), duplicating, packaging, marketing and retail and 
specialized retail distribution. Specialists all admit that the break-even point 
of a game developed for a latest-generation console and sold €50 (LE 
DIBERDER, 2001) is at least 100,000 units. The development of a game 
requires specific software tools: game engines which are pieces of software 
(middleware) dedicated to video game development and intended to 
manage the various functions of a game. It is a complete software 
framework which allows developers to assemble the various creative data: 
graphics, sound, physical interactions (gravity, deformation) and AI. For 
each of these elements, there are also dedicated engines. Each game 
engine is unique.  
These various software suites of engines (3D, physics) are usually 
created by specialized publishers who sell (under licence) their software to 
developers to create games. Though these engines are usually 
multiplatform, they are nevertheless developed for a specific console and 
more or less efficiently withstand porting to others. Indeed, the performance 
of these engines is intimately linked to the technical specifications of the 
consoles for which they were developed. De facto, the complexity of these 
engines has naturally followed that of consoles, making game engines 
complex tools, even for professionals. For a development studio, the choice 
is thus whether to buy or develop – partly or fully – the engines necessary N. DAIDJ & T. ISCKIA  39 
for their game.  However, the investment that the development of game 
engines represents today is constantly increasing, which makes breaking 
even difficult, sometimes impossible, with a single or even a collection of 
games. In the face of increasing development costs and cycles, studios have 
ever more incentive to create multiplatform games (multi-homing). This 
explains the reluctance of third-party developers to sign exclusive contracts 
for their flagship games.  
   Conclusion 
The video game industry is very peculiar – it is a platform industry 
characterized by the existence of crossed network externalities, which 
demands that manufacturers be able to reconcile the interests of both sides 
of the market: third-party developers on the one hand, gamers on the other. 
In this perspective, the value proposition made to these communities must 
be attractive enough to trigger crossed externalities. De facto, the console 
manufacturers' ability to generate revenue depends on their ability to 
reconcile the interests of two complementary communities of specific 
players. This explains why Sony's and Microsoft's BMs are quite similar. By 
contesting Sony's leadership, Microsoft acted like an insider by developing a 
'Me-too' offer (PORTER, 1998), i.e. an offer that is very similar to Sony's. 
The core competencies used by Sony and Microsoft are indeed different, 
and this is normal insofar as core competencies are idiosyncratic and 
intricately linked with each company's culture and history (context-specific). 
But overall, the value generating mechanisms brought to bear within the 
framework of their respective BMs are identical. Similarly, the governing 
structures and the pricing models set up to manage relationships with the 
various partners within their respective value networks are similar.  
Yet Microsoft and Sony today remain far behind Nintendo and its Wii. 
Sony's and Microsoft's example illustrates that core competencies do not 
discriminate on performance as much as the positioning choice made 
upstream when the strategy is established. Even so, this does not mean that 
it is impossible to innovate within the business model. Proof of this is the 
recent announcements by Dell and Acer, who wish to enter the video game 
market by offering two consoles equipped with open-source OSs, based on 
various versions of Linux. If these announcements materialize as consoles, 
not only will the industry's dominant BM be affected, but all the relationships 
with members of the value network – and mainly developers – will change. 40     No. 73, 1
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Third party developers will thus no longer have to use development kits and 
engines specific to each console. The OS no longer being proprietary, it 
would become possible to develop games indiscriminately for each console. 
This phenomenon could 'disqualify' Sony's, Nintendo's and Microsoft's offer. 
Furthermore, second-party developers could also emancipate themselves 
from the relationships binding them with console manufacturers. In definitive 
terms, the entire cost structure and distribution of value within the industry 
would be altered.  N. DAIDJ & T. ISCKIA  41 
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